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PERFECT AND IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE-EFFECT OF
FAULT OF DEFENDANT UPON RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE
The law gives to every man the right to protect himself against
an unprovoked attack. Should death or grievous bodily harm be
the probable result of this attack, this right extends even to taking
the life of his assailant, if necessary ' The necessity for taking the
life of the assailant, or for performing the act which results in
his death, may be either real or apparent, so long as the one as-
serting the right acts in good faith with the reasonable belief that
such necessity exists.
If the other elements of self-defense are present, but the at-
tack has been provoked by some fault of the defendant, the courts
are faced with the problem of determining the effect of this fault
on the degree of the homicide. It is held that if the defendant pro-
voked the attack for the purpose of obtaining an excuse to kill the
other, he will not be permitted to go unpunished, but, since malice
aforethought can clearly be shown in this situation, he will be
convicted of murder Where one has provoked the attack by some
'The elements of self-defense are set out in WHARTON, HOMI-
C.DE (3rd ed. 1907) sec. 223: "First, the slayer must have been
reasonably without fault in bringing on the difficulty; second, he
must believe at the time that he is in such immediate danger of los-
ing his own life, or of receiving serious bodily harm, as renders it
necessary to take the life of his assailant to save himself therefrom;
third, the circumstances must have been such as to have warranted
such a belief in the mind of a man of ordinary reason and firmness;
and fourth, there must have been no other convenient or reasonable
mode of escaping or retreating, or declining the combat."
"Williams v. State, 26 Ala. App. 529, 163 So. 668 (1935), People
v. Orosco, 73 Cal. App. 580, 239 Pac. 82 (1925) State v. Jurko, 42
Idaho 319, 245 Pac. 685 (1926), People v. Priddy, 327 ill. 50, 158
N.E. 457 (1927), Parley v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 536, 145 S.W 2d
100 (1940), State v Mosley, 213 N.C. 304, 195 S.E. 830 (1938) State
v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P 2d 46 (1938), Espy v. State, 54 Wyo.
291, 92 P 2d 549 (1939).
"It is the apparent, not the real, necessity to kill in self-defense
against death or great bodily harm which controls on the question
of justification; in such cases, one has the right to act on the reason-
able appearance of things." WHARTON, HoMIcmE (3rd ed. 1907)
sec. 226.
"Belief in danger of fear of death or great bodily harm must
have been actually entertained to justify a homicide, and the homi-
cidal act must have been done under the controlling influence
thereof; and the belief must have been well-founded and honest."
Id. at sec. 228.
"Pope v State, 172 Ark. 61, 287 S.W 747 (1926) McKee v.
State, 198 Ind. 590, 154 N.E. 372 (1926), McCarty v Commonwealth,
244 Ky. 413, 51 S.W 2d 249 (1932) Akes v. States, 31 Okla. Cr. 386,
239 Pac. 187 (1925), Norwood v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. 406, 120 S.W 2d
806 (1938), Scott v Commonwealth, 143 Va. 510, 129 S.E. 360 (1925).
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fault on his part, but without the intention of killing the other,
the law is somewhat confused. In this situation: (a) some courts
will hold him guilty of murder;' (b) others, though denying hn
the right of self-defense, will consider the attack of the deceased
as provocation which will reduce the homicide to manslaughterf
(c) still other courts will hold him guilty of manslaughter by ap-
plying what is called the theory of imperfect self-defense.' This
last theory that of imperfect self-defense, is to be the subject
considered in this note, together with the related subject, perfect
self-defense.
The earliest case found in which the theory of imperfect self-
defense is discussed is Reed v. StateJ In this case, the defendant was
living in adultery with the wife of another. The estranged husband,
breaking into the room where the adulterous couple were living,
assaulted the defendant, who was forced to kill him in self-defense.
The trial court ruled that the defendant had no right to resist the
attack, since, by statute, a husband who found his wife in the act
of adultery was justified in killing her paramour8 On appeal, the
conviction was reversed. The court stated that the trial court con-
strued this statute too broadly in ruling that it not only gave the
husband the right to kill the defendant, but also deprived the de-
fendant of all right of self-defense against the husband, and "The
accused is always guilty or innocent from his own stand-point,
that is, his personal, individual acts with relation to the matter
charged."' However, the court was unwilling to hold that the
homicide was entirely justified:
"A perfect right of self-defense can only obtain
and prevail where the party pleading it acted from
necessity and was wholly free from wrong or blame
in occasioning or producing the necessity which re-
quired his action. If, however, he was in the wrong,-
if he was hinself violating or in the act of violating
the law,-and on account of his own wrong was placed
in a situation wherein it became necessary for him
to defend himself against an attack made upon him-
'Madry v. State, 201 Ala. 513, 78 So. 866 (1918)
"No matter how imminent the danger or pressing the necessity
of the aggressor in the progress of the affray, if he himself has
brought it in, or provoked it, he cannot kill and plead self-defense.
And the situation is unaffected by the fact that he entered into the
difficulty without intent to kill, and the other resorting to a deadly
weapon before the killing." WHARTON, HOMICIDE (3rd ed. 1907) sec.
315.
State v Hill, 4 Dev & Batt. 629 (N.C. 1839)
6Akes v State, 31 Okla. Cr. 386, 239 Pac. 187 (1925), Nicks v.
State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 241, 79 S.W 35 (1904).
'11 Tex. Cr. App. 509 (1882).
8 TEX. PENAL CODE: (Vernon, 1936) art. 1220.
'Reed v State, 11 Tex. Cr. App. 509, 517 (1882).
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self which was superinduced or created by his own
wrong, then the law justly limits his right of self-
defense, and regulates it according to the magnitude
of his own wrong. Such a state of case may be said to
illustrate and determine what in law would be de-
nominated the imperfect right of self-defense."'"
Having established the fact that the defendant will not be allowed
the "perfect" right of self-defense, the court proceeded to deter-
mine the degree of his guilt. Since the defendant was committing a
misdemeanor (adultery) which was the cause of and brought about
the necessity for the homicide, the defendant was held guilty of
manslaughter.
The rule of Reed v. State has been expanded into the more com-
prehensive rule of perfect and imperfect self-defense, as discussed
in a subsequent case, Franklin v. State.' In this opinion, the court
discussed three categories into which homicide cases involving a
plea of self-defense can be placed, according to the degree of the
defendant's fault in provoking the occasion which gave rise to the
necessity for the homicide. The first category includes those cases
in which the provoking act was done with felomous intent or for
the purpose of killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm on the de-
ceased. In cases falling within this category, the right of self-defense
is dened, and the homicide is murder.22 The second category includes
those cases in which the provoking act was a rmsdemeanor, or was
done for the purpose of committing a misdemeanor, or is an act well
calculated to start a fight.' In these cases, the right of self-defense
is not denied, but is abridged, or, as it is usually expressed, it is
imperfect. This homicide is manslaughter.' The third category in-
cludes those cases in which there is neither an illegal act nor an act
well calculated to start a fight. In such a case, the right of self-
defense is perfect, and the homicide will be excused.&' The opinion
of Franklin v. State, accordingly presents an analysis, prevailing
in those states where the theory of imperfect self-defense is ac-
"Id. at 517-518.
" 30 Tex. App. 638, 18 S.W 468 (1892).
2'Coyle v. State, 31 Tex. Crm. Rep. 604, 21 S.W 765 (1893),
Gonzales v State, 30 Tex. App. 203, 16 S.W 978 (1891).
"Compare Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 638, 18 S.W 468
(1892), with Barber v State, 87 Tex. Crim. Rep. 585, 223 S.W 457
(1920), on the question of what are acts well calculated to start a
fight. It appears that guilt or innocence from the defendant's view-
point is one of the factors, if not the factor, which determines this
question.
"Arto v. State, 19 Tex. App. 126 (1885).
"Saens v. State, 20 S.W 737 (Tex. 1892), Bonnard v. State, 25
Tex. App. 173, 7 S.W 862 (1888)
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cepted, of the effect of the defendant's fault in provoking the at-
tack which made the homicide necessary. '
While the theory of perfect and imperfect self-defense for
determining the effect of the defendant's fault on ins right of self-
defense is not accepted in the majority of states, it will be seen
that it represents no radical departure from the generally accepted
law of homicide." In cases falling within category one, those m
which the provoking act was done with felomous intent or for the
purpose of killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm, the natural
result is that the homicide is murder. Here, malice aforethought
exists, either expressly, as evidenced by the defendant's intent to
kill or inflict grievous bodily harm, or npliedly, m accordance
with the felony murder rule.' In cases falling within category two,
where the provoking act was a misdemeanor, or was done for the
purpose of committing a misdemeanor, or is an act well calculated
to start a fight, no malice exists. However, the homicide, being the
result of a misdemeanor, is wrongful. The expected result, that
the homicide is manslaughter, is reached here. Category three,
"Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466, 16 S. Ct. 859, 40 L. Ed.
1039 (1896), Kinney v. People, 108 Ill. 519 (1884), State v. Painter,
329 Mo. 314, 44 S.W 2d 79 (1931), Barber v. State, 87 Tex. Crm.
Rep. 585, 223 S. W 457 (1920) State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 Pac.
458 (1929).
" Suggestions on this theory can be found in 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES (11th ed. 1790) 187" "For the law intends that the
quarrel or assault arose from some unknown wrong, or some provo-
cation, either in word or deed: and since in quarrels both parties
may be, and usually are, in some fault; and it scarce can be tried
who was originally in the wrong; the law will not hold the survivor
entirely guiltless."
"It has been suggested that the rule, that any homicide which
occurs in the course of a felony is murder, is not based on sound
legal principles. See 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CiuvAL LAw OF
ENGLAND (1883) 57. It has also been suggested that the rule, that
any homicide which occurs in the course of a misdemeanor is man-
slaughter, is not exactly true. A distinction is made between misde-
meanors which are malum in se, which result in manslaughter, and
those which are malum prohibitum, which do not; or between those
misdemeanors which have a causal connection with the homicide,
which results in manslaughter, and those with no causal connection,
which do not have such a result. See Wilner, Untntentional Homiczde
in the Commission of an Unlawful Act (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv.
811. But it cannot be doubted that a homicide which results in the
course of a felony, which is itself so dangerous as to be a wanton act,
is murder, in accordance with the rule of implied malice, or negli-
gent murder. In the same way, if the misdemeanor is itself an act
which is dangerous to human life, the homicide is manslaughter.
Whether these limitations on the felony murder and misdemeanor
manslaughter rules are accepted or not, the theory of this note is not
affected, although the results of individual cases may differ.
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containing cases in which the defendant is without fault and con-
sequently has the perfect right of self-defense, should require no
explanation or justification.
It is submitted that the foregoing analysis represents the most
logical and reasonable approach to the problem which is taken by
the courts today. It is superior to the strict rule, (a) supra, which
denies anyone the right to self-defense if he is at fault, even though
the fault is no more than a misdemeanor, since it avoids the extreme
result of branding him as a murderer merely because he is guilty of
some minor infraction of the law. While this extreme result is
avoided by those courts, (b) supra, which will not accept the im-
perfect self-defense theory, but which will allow the defendant to
plead provocation where it is not shown that he had the intent to
kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased, nevertheless
these courts take the illogical position of nnplymg heat and passion
in a case where the defendant's proof tends to establish self-defense.
The legal concept of heat and passion and that of self-defense
differ greatly. "Heat and passion" implies the partial loss of one's
powers of reason, whereas "self-defense" denotes the full possession
of one's reason, and the exercise of that reason in estimating the
ferocity of the attack, its probable consequences, and the necessary
measures for the defender to take to avert such consequences. The
rule herein discussed is not open to these objections. Without re-
sorting to any fiction, it affords an adequate method for punishing
the person who seeks to conceal his malice behind the cloak of self-
defense, but does not treat with undue harshness the person who.
being slightly at fault, finds himself faced with the choice of killing
or being killed.
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